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The New Business Rule and the Denial of Lost Profits
[Mien keep their promises when neither side can get anything by the breaking of them.'
I. INRODUCTION
American contract law is based on the private2 exchange of promises between
individuals. Because it is essential that individuals be able to rely on these promises
in determining their future business plans and in assessing the risks of contracts or
ventures entered, the law of contract damages generally requires that a breaching
party pay to the injured party damages based on the injured party's expectation
interest, i.e., an amount sufficient to put the injured party in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed. 3 In line with Solon's view that
"men keep their promises when neither side can get anything by the breaking of
them," '4 the expectation interest ensures that before a breaching party can get
anything through breach, he must give the injured party all the benefits he would have
enjoyed had the contract been honored.
The new business rule, however, is a rule that artificially reduces the injured
party's expectation interest. This rule provides that, as a matter of law, a new or
unestablished business cannot recover lost profits because absent a history of past
profits, future profits are too "uncertain, contingent, and speculative." 5 By denying
anticipated future profits, the new business rule automatically precludes one
important aspect of the expectation interest and, thus, artificially increases the gain
to the breaching party from breaking his promise. Ohio is among a minority of states
which continues to adhere to the new business rule6 to deny recovery of lost profits
as a matter of law when there is no track record of business profits.
This Note focuses on the new business rule and its declining significance as a
restraint on contract damages. The Note first examines the historical development of
court-created limitations on the expectation interest and the consequent emergence of
the new business rule as a limitation demanding that damages be proved with
1. PwurAsc, THE Lwv OF m NoBLE GRecs AND lr RosmiS 100 (J. Dryden trans., rev. by Arthur Hugh Clough
1981).
2. While twentieth century commentators consistently characterize contracts as "private," doctrines such as the
implied-in-law contract or quasi-contract create public obligations. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 999, 1000-02 (1985). The author concludes that the public aspect of contracts is
"consistently 'reprivatized,' with the undoing of a defective deal presented as depending upon the absence of will or intent
rather than a mere inequivalence of exchange .... [YetJ this privatization ineluctably partakes of the public." Id. at
1001,
3. See infra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
4. PLtu'Rcn, supra note 1, at 100.
5. See, e.g., Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680,692-93, 160 P.2d 832, 840 (1945). See also Hickman v. Coshocton
Real Estate Co., 58 Ohio App. 38,43-44, 15 N.E.2d 648, 650 (1936) (future profits of a new business are "too uncertain
and speculative").
6. Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file); Hickman v. Coshocton Real Estate Co., 58 Ohio App. 38, 15 N.E.2d 648 (1936).
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certainty. It next analyzes Ohio's treatment of lost profits as typical of those states
still adhering to a strict application of the new business rule: evidence of lost profits
is inadmissible because lost profits are per se uncertain. This Note then discusses the
trend in other American jurisdictions toward allowing the owner of a new business to
recover lost profits if the owner can prove such profits with reasonable certainty.
Finally, this Note shows that an economic analysis of contract damages presents not
only an interesting parallel to traditional contract analysis but also a further
justification for abandoning the new business rule. This Note concludes that Ohio and
other jurisdictions still applying the new business rule should abandon the rule in
favor of the majority approach.
11. ORIGIN OF THE NEW BUSINESS RULE
The new business rule developed as a restriction on the general principle of
contract damages which provides that an injured party should receive an award based
on his expectation interest. 7 As traditionally formulated, recovery of the expectation
interest provides that the injured party receive an amount sufficient to put him in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. 8 The rules
defining damage awards, however, were created largely during the nineteenth century
when America was still a young, industrializing nation. In an effort to spur economic
growth, early common law courts developed several limitations9 on a party's
7. R.sAia sNirr (SEcoNo) or Con.Acis § 347 (1981) [hereinafter RsrATEmErr (SEcoNo)l. Section 347 defines the
expectation interest as follows:
Subject to the limitations stated in 88 350-53, the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation
interest as measured by
(a) the loss in value to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
Less formally, the expectation interest gives the promisee the "benefit of his bargain"-the amount required to put
the promisee in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. D. Dons, HAsoNo ox
-su LAw OF RsEssotns § 12.1, at 786 (1973); see also infra note 8.
8. 5 A. CotBiN, Consa ON Cor-ercrs § 992, at 5 (1964); srSsAnsisT (SEcoND), supra note 7, § 347 comment a
(to the extent possible, contract damages return to the injured party an amount sufficient to put him in the position he
would have been in had the contract been performed); II S. Wn.usroN, A TisEMS oN rHE LAw OF Coochers § 1338 (3d
ed. 1968) ("the general purpose of the law is, and should be, to give compensation, that is, to put the plaintiff in as good
a position as he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract.").
9. The common law courts developed three principal limitations on a promisee's recovery of his expectation
interest, which still restrict recovery of damages in contract today, First, a party cannot recover damages for any loss he
could have avoided after the breach. Second, a party cannot recover damages beyond the amount that was foreseeable as
a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. Third, a party cannot recover damages unless they are proved
with reasonable certainty. E.A. FARuswoa;s, CoxNmscrs § 12.8, at 841 (1982).
The Second Restatement of Contracts defines these three limitations as follows:
§ 350. Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have
avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule stated in Subsection (1) to the extent that he
has made reasonable buf unsuccessful attempts to avoid loss.
§ 351. Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable
result of the breach when the contract was made.
§ 352. Uncertainty as a Limitation on Damages
Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with
reasonable certainty.
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recovery of his expectation interest in order to preclude large or excessive damages' o
and to limit jury discretion. " One such limitation was the requirement that an injured
party prove his damages with "certainty." 1 2 American common law courts used this
certainty requirement as a primary means of reducing damage awards and, thus, the
risks taken by entrepreneurs.' 3 The new business rule, which evolved as a specific
application of the rule of certainty, served as an additional tool for minimizing
potentially disproportionate damage awards.
Paralleling the development of restraints on the amount of contract damages was
the emergence of the precept that a promisor had no moral obligation to keep his
promises. Indeed, Justice Holmes, in accord with his objective view of contract law
in general,' 4 promulgated the idea that every person had a right to break his contract
if he chose to do so.' 5 According to Holmes, there was to be no moral opprobrium
attached to a breach of contract-a promisor could either choose to perform his
contract as he had promised or he could breach and pay damages. 16 This philosophy
encouraged entrepreneurs to move easily from an unprofitable enterprise to a more
profitable one and, at least in theory, led to economic growth. Thus, Professor E.
Allen Farnsworth has aptly observed that the American law of contract damages,
"heavily influenced by the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a
REsTATEmENT (SEco',), supra note 7, §§ 350-52, at 126-49.
10. Note, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992,
998 (1956) ("Although the foresceability rule is directed primarily toward the problem of excessive damages and the
certainty rule toward the problem of proof, the distinction is often blurred and either rule can be related to both
problems."). In accord is the Second Restatement of Contracts which notes that while the problem of extremely
disproportionate damages is usually limited by denial of "unforeseeable" damages, "[s]ometimes these limits are
covertly imposed by means of an especially demanding requirement . . . of certainty."). REsTATEmENr (SEco'e), supra
note 7, § 351 comment f, at 142.
11. According to Professor McCormick, limitations on modem contract damages originated from the desire of
judges for greater control over the jury. In the eighteenth century, judges began to make large inroads in the jury's
discretion to award appropriate contract or tort damages. Eventually, judges garnered substantial control over the damage
award through the authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence, to grant new trials for excessive awards, and to
instruct thejury on the manner of calculating damages. The modem rules of unforeseability and uncertainty also evolved
from the struggle to strengthen judicial control. C. McCo.,ncK, HANDBooK NTHE Lsw or DA.troEs § 138, at 562 (1935);
E.A. FARNsSoru, supra note 9, § 12.8, at 840 (the expectation interest is "severely limited by rules that grew out of the
attempts by judges . . . to control the award of damages by juries."); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 CoLutm. L. REv. 1145, 1210 (1970).
12. See D. DoBas, supra note 7, § 12.3, at 798-99; E.A. FARNSWoRTH, supra note 9, § 12.15, at 881-88;
REsTATEM'r (SECo.ND), supra note 7, § 352 ("Damages are not recoverable beyond the amount that the evidence permits
to be established with reasonable certainty."). See generally A. CoRBtN, supra note 8, §§ 1020-23, at 124-57.
13. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1216; Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RtrroEs L. REv. 273, 273-74 (1970).
14. See generally O.W. HouaEs, THE Cowstos L,,w 227-40 ([1881] Howe ed. 1963); B. KAPLAN, Encounters with
O.W. Holmes, Jr. 6-7, in HoLmEs AND THE Co.mo. Lw: A CsENxRY LATER (1983); G. Gu-LoE, THE DEAT OF Co,,rAcr
35-52 (1974).
15. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAiv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).
16. Id. ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,--and nothing else. . . . If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised
event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those
who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can."); O.W. HoLuiEs, supra note 14, at 236 ("The
only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfilment has gone by,
and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses."); But cf. R. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 106 (3d
ed. 1986) (Holmes' formulation is useful but "overbroad.").
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marked solicitude for men who do not keep their promises."' 17 This solicitude for the
contract breaker, moreover, necessitated limitations on the size of damage awards
because entrepreneurs could not be encouraged to shift their capital to more profitable
ventures if breach of contract were punished severely.
The certainty limitation requiring that contract damages be "certain" was
originally a rule requiring absolute certainty.' 8 A promisee could recover no damages
save those that were shown with complete certainty. 19 This formulation of the
certainty requirement was, of necessity, soon modified to a rule of reasonable
certainty because "if absolute certainty were required as to the precise amount of loss
that the plaintiff had suffered, no damages would be recovered at all in the great
number of cases.' '20 Today, all American jurisdictions enforce the certainty limita-
tion but require only "reasonable" certainty. 2' The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts also expresses the certainty requirement in terms of reasonableness:
"[d]amages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits
to be established with reasonable certainty.' 22 Even under this modified certainty
requirement, however, lost profits have frequently been denied for breach of contract
with a new or unestablished business. 23
In purpose and in practice, then, the certainty requirement operated to control
the discretion of jurors and, thus, preclude excessive damage awards. In fact,
Professor McCormick concluded that "[tihe standard of 'certainty' was developed,
and has been used, chiefly, as a convenient means for keeping within the bounds of
reasonable expectation the risk which litigation imposes upon commercial enter-
prise." 24
The certainty requirement placed two negative restrictions on the size of contract
damage awards. First, it increased the injured party's burden of persuasion beyond
17. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1216.
18. In Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858), which Professor McCormick recognizes as a "classic statement"
of the early certainty rule, the court required that "damages to be recovered from a breach of contract be shown with
certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture . Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858).
19. Id.
20. J. MAYNE & H. McGREGOR, MAYNE & McGREGOR oN DAsfAFes § 174, at 163 (12th ed. 1961).
21. See generally C. McCosucK, supra note 11, § 26, at 99-100 ("[T]he certainty rule in its most important
aspect, is a standard requiring a reasonable degree of persuasiveness in the proof of the fact and of the amount of
damage. . . .[I]t appears that the epithet certainty is overstrong, and that the standard is a qualified one, of 'reasonable
certainty' merely, or, in other words, of 'probability."') (emphasis in original); S. WamusoN, supra note 8, § 1345, at
234-37.
Further, the following principles listed in McCormick are used by courts to avoid the harsh results inherent in a strict
application of the certainty doctrine:
a) If the fact of damage is proved with certainty, the extent or amount may be left to reasonable inference.
b) Where the defendant's wrong has caused the difficulty of proof of damage, he cannot complain of the
resulting uncertainty.
c) Mere difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damage is not fatal.
d) Mathematical precision in fixing the exact amount is not required.
e) If the best evidence of the damage of which the situation admits is furnished, this is sufficient.
C. MCCoRCK, supra note 11, § 27, at 101.
22. RSATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 7, § 352, at 144.
23. See infra note 32.
24. C. McCopsiicK, supra note 11, § 28, at 105; see also Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1213 (quoting this passage
from McCossicx, supra note 11, in explaining the evolution of the certainty requirement).
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the normal preponderance test. 25 In most civil cases, the plaintiff need only prove his
case by a preponderance. The requirement of certainty, however, raises the quantum
of proof for damages above the more-likely-than-not standard. Second, in some
instances, the certainty rule did more than increase the injured party's burden of
proof; it became a rule of admissibility that justified exclusion of evidence if the judge
deemed the evidence uncertain as a matter of law. 26 The new business rule is an
example of the latter type of certainty restriction: the rule makes all lost profits of a
new business uncertain per se, i.e., evidence of lost future profits is, as a matter of
law, inadmissible.2 7
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW BusiNEsS RULE TODAY
American jurisdictions today apply the new business rule in two greatly
divergent ways. One group applies the rule as an absolute bar to the recovery of
prospective profits by a new or unestablished business.28 These jurisdictions contend
that lost profits of a new business are, as a matter of law, too uncertain, contingent,
or speculative to be recovered. Thus, an injured promisee in these jurisdictions must
come within one of an increasing number of exceptions 29 created by the courts in
order to recover lost profits. Ohio falls within this category.3 0
The clear and growing majority of courts, however, now apply the new business
rule as a rule which delimits the sufficiency of evidence. 3t In these jurisdictions, the
new business rule merely restates and emphasizes the evidentiary requirement that a
new business, like an existing business, must prove lost profits with reasonable
certainty.
A. The New Business Rule as a Per Se Bar to Recovery of Lost Profits
1. General Background
A dwindling number of jurisdictions still use the new business rule mechanically
to deny recovery of anticipated future profits to a new business, as a matter of law,
because there is no history of past profits from which to project future profits. 32 These
25. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1210-1.
26. Id. at 1210. See also Note, supra note 10, at 998-99 (the certainty, unforeseeability, and causation restrictions
have all been used to find inadmissible evidence offered to establish lost profits).
27. Professor Dobbs suggests that part of the reason for the development of the new business rule is that common
law courts were traditionally more concerned with protecting capital than income. Lost profits, of course, were part of
the plaintiff's expected income. To the common law court, however, the value of capital was more important than the
value of the income or lost profits that might have been made through collateral transactions. Thus, Dobbs concludes that
rules denying lost profits are frequently unconcerned with the certainty of proof. D. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.3, at 154.
28. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 48-78 and accompanying text.
30. Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file); Hickman v. Coshocton Real Estate Co., 58 Ohio App. 38, 15 N.E.2d 648 (1936).
31. See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
32. G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985) (construing Florida law); Coastland
Corp. v. Third Nat'l Bank Mortgage Co., 611 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1979) (construing Virginia law); Poultry Health Serv.
of Ga., Inc. v. Moxley, 538 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (construing Georgia law); Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council
of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsh Distrib., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958 (Fla. Dist.
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jurisdictions provide a definite, bright line test which promotes efficiency and judicial
economy,33 but the rule leads often to harsh results since the plaintiff may be denied
part of his expectation interest solely because it is, by chance, a new business rather
than an established business. Thus, there is an increasing trend in states espousing a
per se application of the new business rule to create "exceptions and mitigating
subdoctrines" 34 which threaten to subsume the new business rule without outright
court abandonment. 35
Ohio courts fall squarely within the minority group of states which still adhere
to a rigid application of the new business rule.36 Ohio has never seriously considered
discarding the new business rule but, in line with other states still retaining the rule,
has broadened existing exceptions and created new limitations in an effort to soften
the rule's harsh effects.
2. Application of the New Business Rule in Ohio
Ohio first adopted the new business rule in 1936, 37 noting that there existed
"almost universal support" 38 for denying prospective profits absent provable
documentation of past profits.39 In 1979, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio in Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo,4° signaled continued
adherence to the principle.41 In Sambo's, the plaintiff, Sambo's, sued the City
Council of Toledo for anticipated future profits claiming that the City Council had
violated the first amendment guaranty of free speech when it revoked restaurant
permits because the trade name "Sambo's" had racial connotations. 42 Although the
district court meticulously established that "the record not only shows evidence of
damages, but establishes beyond question that the real damages suffered by the
plaintiff are irreparable," the court flatly rejected the plaintiff's proof of lost
profits.43 Without comment or consideration of the policies underlying the new
business rule, the court held:
Ct. App. 1983); In re Phoenix Restoration Specialists, Inc., 14 Bankr. 115 (Bankr. Mass. 1981); Schechter v. Flavor
Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985)(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Hickman
v. Coshocton Real Estate Co., 58 Ohio App. 38, 15 N.E.2d 648 (1936); Anbeck Co. v. Zapata Corp., 641 S.W.2d 608
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982); My Sister's Place v. City of Burlington, 139 Vt. 602, 433 A.2d 275 (1981); Kay Advertising Co.
v. Olde London Transp. Co., 216 Va. 273, 217 S.E.2d 876 (1975).
33. Note, Lost Profits for Unestablished Business: Should Virginia Retain the New Business Rule?, 67 VA. L. REv.
433-39 (1981). In this Note, the author answers in the affirmative the question he poses in the title of his article,
concluding that the efficiency and judicial economy inherent in the bright line new business rule outweigh the advantages
of fairness to be gained by abandoning the per se rule.
34. Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1,344 S.E.2d 82, 91 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987); see also Comment, Remedies-Lost Profit as Contract
Damages for an Unestablished Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 695 (1978).
35. See generally R. Du"m, REcovERY oF DAAGEes ro Lost PRomrrs 2D §§ 4.4-4.7, at 200-12 (2d ed. 1981).
36. See supra note 32.
37. Hickman v. Coshocton Real Estate Co., 58 Ohio App. 38, 15 N.E.2d 648 (1936).
38. Id. at 32, 15 N.E.2d at 650.
39. Id.
40. 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 179.
43. Id. at 181.
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The law is well established that loss of profits from a new business enterprise is too
speculative to be allowed as an element of damages. Only where the evidence establishes a
history of profitable operations, followed by the actionable wrong and a diminution of
profits, can there be any recovery.44
The court gave no consideration to the fact that the plaintiff might be able to show
evidence of lost profits by means other than a past history of profits, such as by
comparison to other similar restaurants in the locale 45 or through business projections
and expert testimony. 46
Although Ohio courts retain the bright line distinction between new and existing
businesses, 47 the courts have acted in accord with courts in other jurisdictions to
narrow the scope of the rule.48 Thus, Ohio has allowed an established business which
had never shown a profit to prove lost future profits by means other than a past history
of success. 49 In Brookridge Party Center v. Fisher Foods, Inc. ,50 for example, the
plaintiff was an established business which had experienced "consistent business
losses."'" The Ohio Appellate Court for the Eighth District held that when a going
business has never shown a profit but has "favorable prospects," lost profits are not
automatically too speculative or uncertain as a matter of law. 5 2 The court allowed the
plaintiff to try to prove lost profits with reasonable certainty, through expert
testimony and profit projections.5 3
The court suggested in Brookridge Party Center54 that allowance of lost profits
to an established business which had never produced a profit was at variance with
cases applying the new business rule,5s but it made no attempt to distinguish the two
situations or to reject the new business rule. Most other jurisdictions addressing the
issue concur in the conclusion that the established but initially unsuccessful business
44. Id. (emphasis added). In Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan.
31, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file), the court cites this portion of Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo
as controlling law in Ohio, and, indeed, this is an accurate summation of the new business rule as applied in Ohio. The
case, however, actually construes federal law.
45. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
47. An existing business, by virtue of its history of past profits, may recover anticipated future profits. A new
business, however, is automatically denied even the opportunity to attempt to prove lost profits. Under this approach, past
profits are not merely the best data from which to project future profits, they are the only sufficient evidence. See
Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file).
48. See, e.g., G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985) (construing Florida law:
a business in existence for three months is not a new business); Pauline's Chicken Villa v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.,
701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) (a franchise is sufficiently similar to other franchise outlets to negate nearly all uncertainty
in proof of lost profits); General Dynafab, Inc. v. Chelsea Indus. Inc., 301 Pa. Super. 261, 447 A.2d 958 (1982) (if a
new business can show a "significant interest" in the product and sufficient commitments for orders, it may recover lost
profits).
49. Brookridge Party Center v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 12 Ohio App. 3d 130, 468 N.E.2d 63 (1983).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 136, 468 N.E.2d at 71.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 135-36, 468 N.E.2d at 71.
54. Id. at 130, 468 N.E.2d at 63.
55. Id. at 136,468 N.E.2d at 71. The court explicitly compared Hickman v. Coshocton Real Estate Co., 58 Ohio
App. 38, 15 N.E.2d 648 (1936), which first stated Ohio's adherence to the new business rule, to its holding that lost
revenues could be received by a business with no prior profit history. Id.
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need not show previous success or profits to recover lost profits. 56 The usual rationale
is that many new businesses sustain a period of initial losses before becoming
profitable, and it is, therefore, unfair to deny prospective profits to the established
though initially unprofitable enterprise. 57
A second method of circumventing the strict all-or-nothing effects of the new
business rule is to narrow the scope of the term "new business." Another Ohio case,
Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., 58 evidences this method of mitigating the
unfairness of the per se ban on recovery of lost profits. In Schechter, Herbert
Schechter, the owner of a small packaging plant, entered into written agreements with
defendant Flavor Kitchens under which Flavor Kitchens contracted to package and
sell products for Schechter under Schechter's label. 59 Under Flavor Kitchens'
management, the high quality of plaintiff's packaging declined almost immedi-
ately. 60 Schechter sued for breach of contract, and the trial court awarded lost profits
as part of the damage award. 6' On appeal, the Ohio Appellate Court for the Eighth
District confirmed that Ohio adheres to the new business rule and prohibits recovery
of lost profits as a matter of law but stated that, under the facts of the instant case,
the enterprise was not a "new business." ' 62 Instead, contracting out the packaging
process to another company was a continuation of Schechter's previous business
under a new guise. 63 Thus, the court held that the new business rule is still controlling
law in Ohio, but because the plaintiff came within an exception to the rule, it could
try to prove lost profits through any evidence sufficient to establish profits with
reasonable certainty. 64
While this solution is fair in that it did not automatically deny the plaintiff a
chance to prove lost profits, it is not logically consistent with the premise of the new
business rule which holds that, without a history of past profits, lost future profits are
simply too speculative to be recovered. 65 In the Schechter case, the defendant
packaging company had no history of past success packaging these particular items
for Schechter or for Schechter's customers. Thus, according to the strict logic of the
56. See, e.g., Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Assocs., 584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978); Westric Battery Co. v.
Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1973); National Soda Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193,
143 P.2d 12 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 793, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 768 (1944); Dean W. Knight & Sons v. First
W. Bank & Trust Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 560, 148 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1978); Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co., 262 Cal.
App. 2d 582, 68 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968); Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 518 P.2d 512 (1974); Bader v.
Cerri, 96 Nev. 352, 609 P.2d 314 (1980); Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1,390 P.2d 677 (1964). But cf.
Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979); McBrayer v. Teckla, Inc., 496 F.2d 122, reh'g
denied, 502 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1974); Murcurio v. Urroz, 455 So. 2d 463 (Fla. App. 1984) (All found a history of past
profits necessary). Cases cited in this footnote were cited in R. Dum, supra note 35, § 4.6, at 206.
57. R. DuNN, supra note 35, § 4.6, at 209-10: "The plaintiff who opens a new business may often pass through
a promotional stage while incurring losses. . . . It may be more difficult for a plaintiff to project profits from a history
of losses, but having made a convincing showing, he should not be denied recovery."
58. No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 4-5.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 8-9.
65. See R. DuNN, supra note 35, § 4.7, at 212 (Ifa court adheres to the new business rule, it should probably apply
the rule to new ventures of existing businesses).
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new business rule, future profits were uncertain and should have been denied. The
court reached the correct conclusion that the plaintiff should be allowed to try to
prove lost profits as long as the profits can be proved with reasonable certainty, since
this is the rule applied to established businesses. 66 The court should not, however,
have created a new and inconsistent exception to the new business rule in order to
reach this conclusion. Instead, it should have rejected the new business rule outright
and held that, like its precursor "certainty," the new business rule is better employed
as a rule of reasonable certainty that merely characterizes the quantum of evidence
needed to obtain lost profits. 67
Other jurisdictions have developed additional methods of avoiding the strict
application of the new business rule. One technique is to recharacterize the recently
established business as an "existing" or "established" business. An example of this
recharacterization can be found in G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp.68 In Brod,69
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that it is "the settled law of
Florida that [for a new business] 'proof of profits for a reasonable time anterior to the
breach is required to establish lost profits.'"70 The court then held that a business
which had only existed for three months was not "in its inception at the time of
defendants' breach" and thus could prove lost profits by a means other than a history
of past profits. 71 The plaintiff successfully proved lost profits through expert
testimony based largely on profit projections and comparisons with industry averages
for comparable businesses. 72 Other courts have likewise allowed proof of lost profits
based on a new business' short period of operation. 73
This type of exception may also be inconsistent with the premise of the new
business rule that only a history of past profits can ensure that there will be future
profits. Unless the three month profit history in Brod produced sufficient data from
which to extrapolate future profits, this exception for the recently established business
is little more than a fiction contrived to circumvent the rule in appropriate cases-
cases in which profits can be proved with reasonable certainty. A court willing to
create this type of exception to the new business rule effectively abrogates the rule in
favor of a rule of evidence. 74 The court should, instead, admit its disenchantment
66. See, e.g., Charles R. Combs Trucking, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 12 Ohio St. 3d 241, 466 N.E.2d
883 (1984) (lost profits are recoverable when proved with reasonable certainty).
67. 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 8, § 1022, at 139 ("The term 'speculative and uncertain' is not really a classification
of profits, but is instead a characterization of the evidence that is introduced to prove that they [profits] would have been
made if the defendant had not committed a breach of contract. The law requires that this evidence shall not be so meager
or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages to be determined by sympathy and feelings
alone.").
68. 759 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1537.
71. Id. at 1537-38.
72. Id. at 1538-39.
73. See, e.g., Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 983 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1087 (1978) (five months). But cf. Pollack v. Morelli, 245 Pa. Super. 388, 397-98, 369 A.2d 458, 463 (1976) (nine
months operation by plaintiff plus twelve months operation by plaintiff's predecessor not sufficient to create an
established business).
74. See R. DuNN, supra note 35, § 4.4, at 201-02.
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with the all-or-nothing quality of the new business rule and repudiate the rule without
qualification.
Another arena in which courts are displaying increasing reluctance to apply the
new business rule is that of the recently established franchise or chain store.75 As
noted in Pauline's Chicken Villa v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.,76 certain
characteristics of franchise outlets eliminate nearly all uncertainty. When the
franchisor is a national or regional franchisor with uniform advertising and quality
control, and when there is available data on earnings and expenses and on failure and
success ratios from similar locations, the franchisee can usually show lost profits with
"reasonable certainty.' ,77 It should be allowed to do so. If, in addition, the franchisee
is experienced in the particular business or has a past record of success in that
industry, the case for awarding lost profits becomes even stronger. 78
3. Abrogation of the New Business Rule in Ohio
Although the eighth Ohio appellate court in Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc.
79
affirmed the new business rule, it argued persuasively in dicta for Ohio's abandon-
ment of the rule. 80 First, the court noted that the trend in other jurisdictions is to allow
a new business to recover anticipated profits when it can prove lost profits with
reasonable certainty. 81 The court further intimated that Ohio could abandon rigid
adherence to the new business rule by noting that there are various methods other than
a past profit history by which a plaintiff can show lost profits with reasonable
certainty: by comparison with a business similar in size, location, and nature; by
examination of the profit performance of plaintiff's successor; by comparison to a
similar business operated by the plaintiff; or, by expert testimony and business
forecasting techniques.82
Finally, the court found support for abandoning the new business rule by
analogizing to a similar measure taken by the Ohio General Assembly in enacting
Ohio's commercial code. 83 Comment 2 to Ohio Revised Code, section 1302.8284
[UCC section 2-708] explicitly rejects the requirement that a new business demon-
strate past earnings in order to recover anticipated profits: "[i]t is not necessary to
recovery of 'profit' to show a history of earnings, especially if a new venture is
involved."' 85 Although section 1302.82 deals with the sale of goods and thus is not
75. Pauline's Chicken Villa v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985); Smith Dev. Corp. v.
Bilow Enters., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973).
76. 701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985).
77. Id. at 401.
78. Id. at 401-02.
79. No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
80. Id. at 6 n.2.
81. Id. at 5-6 n.l. For a list of jurisdictions which have abandoned the rule, see infra note 108.
82. Id. at 6 n.2. See generally S. WIusToN, supra note 8, § 1346A, at 245-51 (3d ed. 1968) (explaining that when
proof of profits made by others, by the plaintiff in a similar business, or through expert testimony is the best evidence
available, it should be sufficient if it presents a reasonable inference that profits would have been made).
83. Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. at 6 n.2 (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
84. OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 1302.82 comment 2 (Anderson 1979).
85. Id. (emphasis added). See also Caselton, Lost Profit Damage Awards Under Uniform Commercial Code
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directly applicable to most breach of contract cases leading to lost profits by a new
business, the statute does illustrate the judgment of the Ohio legislature that, at least
in some cases, a new business in Ohio should not automatically be denied lost profits
as a matter of law.
While arguing cogently for abandonment of the rigid new business rule in Ohio,
the Schechter court refused to abrogate the rule. It opted, instead, to widen the
exceptions to the rule. 86 Ohio and other jurisdictions could probably continue to
award fair damages in many, although not all, cases by following the present
procedure of increasing the number and scope of exceptions to the new business rule.
The courts should, however, repudiate the new business rule and acknowledge that
the rule, as an absolute bar to recovery of lost profits by a new business, is no longer
helpful or desirable. 87
4. Deterioration of the Rule's Foundation
Just as the new business rule is facing increasing resistance in the courts, so the
underlying rationale of the rule is being recognized as outdated 88 or simply
inadequate. 89 Initially, the rule was premised on the assumption that the issue of lost
profits in contract damages should be removed from jury consideration. 90 This
argument rests in large part on a distrust of jurors as the ultimate arbiters of contract
damage awards and a desire to take crucial issues away from that body. This notion
is increasingly at variance with the modem view that jurors are competent to
determine issues of fact. Further, in contract cases concerning lost profits of an
established business, the jury is considered fully competent to receive extensive
evidence and to decide the amount of damages. 91
Moreover, modem rules of evidence help ensure that extensive and complicated
statistical evidence needed to prove lost profits is presented in a manner understand-
able to the trier of fact. 92 For example, the judge rules on the admissibility of
Section 2-708(2), 37 SrAN. L. REv. 1109 (1985) (provides an economic analysis and justification for awarding lost profits
under section 2-708(2) of the UCC in cases involving the sale of goods).
86. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. The court said that contracting out part of a business to a new
packager is not similar to creating a new business even though the new packager has never performed successfully for the
particular customers.
87. The rule is both unhelpful and undesirable because it can operate to preclude legitimate claims based on an
anachronistic determination, which has been refuted by most jurisdictions and commentators, that prospective profits of
a new business are inherently speculative.
88. Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc.,
81 N.C. App. 1, 344 S.E.2d 82 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578
(1987). See generally Comment, supra note 34. But cf. Note, supra note 33 for a justification of the continuing vitality
of the new business rule.
89. See infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Smith v. Shasta Elec. Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 728, 729-31, 12 Cal. Rptr. 167, 169 (1961); Bishop
v. East Ohio Gas Co., 41 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 366-67 (1943); rev'don other grounds, 143 Ohio St. 541, 56 N.E.2d 164
(1944); Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hachmeister Lind Co., 320 Pa. 233, 240-45, 181 A. 787, 790-91
(1935). E.A. FAw.Nsu0Ros, supra note 9, § 12.8 at 840 (Of course, the judge retains control over damages to the extent
that he gives specific instructions to the jury. These instructions include the major limiting rules that damages be certain
and foreseeable and that the plaintiff avoid such losses as can be avoided without undue risk, burden, or humiliation. See
supra note 9 for the RmrATSIENr (SEooND) definitions of these terms.).
92. See Note, supra note 33, at 436-38 for a critical evaluation of the effect of most of the evidentiary advances
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evidence and may exclude evidence he deems too speculative or remote. 93 Both
parties may also present expert testimony94 and may cross-examine the experts at
length95 to ensure the reliability of the evidence so presented. In addition, the
business records and other data from which experts calculate lost profits are no longer
barred by the hearsay rules. 96 Finally, if the actual award is excessive, the trial judge
can use the device of remittitur as an overriding check on the decision of the jurors.
Remittitur is a procedural device by which a trial judge can require that a plaintiff
either accept a lesser award or agree to a new trial limited to the issue of damages,
if the judge determines that the original jury award is grossly excessive. Thus,
because of the efficacy of these evidentiary and procedural measures, it is no longer
necessary to take the issue of damages away from the jury entirely in order to avoid
jury confusion or speculative damage awards.
Closely allied to the aim of circumscribing jury discretion was the goal of
prohibiting excessive damage awards. 97 This policy, of course, implicitly provides
considered herein.The author concludes that "the number of new businesses that could prove lost profits does not justify
the expense and potential [jury] speculation of the evidentiary approach." Id. at 438.
93. See FED. R. Evm. 104(a): "Preliminary questions concerning . .. the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court. ... See also McComacrc ot EviDEscE § 53, at 135 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1984) ("[U]nder the
traditional view and the generally accepted principle the trial judge decides with finality these preliminary questions of
fact upon which depends the admissibility of an item of evidence that is objected to under an exclusionary rule of evidence
[such as the new business rule].").
94. See FED. R. EviD. 702: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." Ouro EvD. R. 702 is identical. In addition, Williston states that proof of lost profits
can be made by expert witnesses as long as the expert's opinion is more than mere conjecture. Williston concludes that
although the witness' testimony cannot be wholly speculative and conjectural, "still the best evidence of which the subject
will admit is receivable, and this is often nothing better than the opinion of well-informed persons upon the subject under
investigation." S. WuarLo,, supra note 8, § 1364A, at 250 (quoting Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 111. 518, 105 N.E.
308 (1914)). The opportunity for cross-examination ensures that the expert testimony will not be wholly speculative and
conjectural. See supra note 92.
95. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may testify as to his opinion or inferences and may give
his reasons for so believing without disclosing the underlying facts or data unless otherwise required by the court. Only
on cross-examination must the expert reveal the data supporting his conclusions. FaD. R. Evm. 705. The Ohio Rule 705,
however, differs markedly from the federal rule in that it requires disclosure of the underlying facts and data before the
expert can give his opinion or conclusions on the subject. See Osno R. Evio. 705: "The expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give his reasons therefore after disclosure of the underlying facts and data." (emphasis added).
The Ohio Rule 705 facilitates understanding of the frequently complex lost profits evidence in two ways. First, it ensures
that the jury is, from the outset, aware of the basis of the expert testimony. If the basis is weak or faulty, the factfinder
will know this before he is swayed by the expert opinion. Second, Ohio Rule 705 shifts the burden of disclosure from the
opposing counsel who will be less conversant with the expert's testimony to the proponent. The Staff Note accompanying
Ohio Rule 705 explains this advantage as follows: "The federal rule can result in disclosure being the burden of the
cross-examiner. Under [Ohio] Rule 705, the disclosure is always on direct exam." The opposing counsel, of course, can
supplement any evidence thus produced through cross-examination.
96. FED. R. Evin. 803(6) provides a hearsay exception allowing introduction of business records including
memoranda, reports, records and data compilations of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis if the data meets
certain requirements set out in the rule. Orno R. EviD. 803(6) provides a similar though somewhat narrower hearsay
exception for business records. Of equal importance is hearsay exception 803(17) which allows introduction of market
quotations, tabulations, lists, directions and other published compilations generally used and relied on by persons in
particular occupations. FED. R. EviD. 803(17). Ohio Rule 803(17) is identical to the federal rule. OHIo R. Evin. 803(17).
97. See Comment, supra note 34, at 696; see also Note, supra note 10, at 1020. Here, the author argues that
although the certainty rule was traditionally concerned with requiring adequate proof of profits, it is sometimes combined
with the causation requirement which demands that the breach be the cause of the lost profits. When certainty and cause
are combined, the focus shifts from problems of proof to avoidance of excessive damage awards. Once the courts see the
problem as one of excessive damages, they frequently use the certainty rule as an "all-or-nothing [bar to] recovery rather
than compromise."
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that, in the interest of commercial enterprise, it is better to limit the injured party's
recovery of his expectation interest than to require the breaching party to pay
excessive damages.98 One commentator has noted that even if placing the risk of
large damages on the injured promisee were a desirable goal, the certainty doctrine
and the new business rule are both overbroad and underbroad and should not be used
as a method of accomplishing this goal. 99 The new business doctrine is underbroad
because whenever a promisee can show a history of past profits, the party may
recover his entire expectation interest no matter how large the award. to Thus, the
new business certainty requirement is inconsistent; it places the burden of excessive
profits on the injured promisee only in the limited number of instances in which a
promisee, by chance, is a new or unestablished business. If the real intent is to burden
the promisee, then a rule should be imposed which does not single out one particular
class of promisees but which applies evenly to all. The new business rule is also
overbroad as a means of limiting excessive jury verdicts because the rule creates an
all-or-nothing bar that mechanically precludes recovery of all profits, even those
profits which can be proved and which are not excessive. 101 Thus, the new business
rule is inherently incapable of satisfactorily addressing the problem of excessive
verdicts. It should not be used for that purpose.
A final justification for the per se new business rule is that it reduces uncertainty,
promotes judicial economy, and avoids the need for extensive evidence concerning
the failed business and alternative measures of damages. In fact, one commentator
argues that the ends of efficiency and judicial economy obtainable under a per se
application of the new business rule outweigh any benefits of allowing the plaintiff
to try to prove lost profits with reasonable certainty. 0 2 While it cannot be denied that
the new business rule, like all bright line rules, naturally serves the goals of certainty
and judicial economy, these goals are not inherently desirable in all instances; the
initial inquiry must be whether the benefits of certainty and efficiency outweigh the
98. Comment, supra note 34, at 704. The Restatement (Second) also recognizes this implicit policy of denying
excessive verdicts, but attempts to face the problem squarely. It avoids facades such as "uncertainty" or
"unforeseeability" and frankly states that awarding the full expectation interest does not always serve the interests of
justice:
It is not always in the interests of justice to require the party in breach to pay damages for all of the foreseeable
loss that he has caused. There are unusual circumstances in which it appears that the parties assumed that one
of them would bear the risk of loss, or that although there was no assumption, it would be unjust to put the risk
on that party. One such circumstance is an extreme disproportion between the loss and the price charged by the
party whose liability for that loss is in question. . . .Typical examples of the limitations imposed on damages
under this discretionary power involve the denial of recovery for loss of profits and the restriction of damages
to loss incurred in reliance on the contract. Sometimes these limits are covertly imposed, by means of an
especially demanding requirement offoreseeabiliry or certainty. The rule stated in this Section recognizes that
what is done in such cases is an imposition of a limitation in the interests of justice.
Rrsr^Am, srr (SEcoND), supra note 7, § 351 comment f (emphasis added).
99. Comment, supra note 34, at 705. Again, this notion comports with the philosophy of the Restatement (Second)
which holds that even though excessive profits are to be avoided in some instances, the court should not deny recovery
entirely but should limit the damages recoverable. REsrATiENT (SEco.so), supra note 7, § 351(3).
100. Comment, supra note 34, at 705.
101. Id. See also Note, supra note 10, at 1020 (using the certainty rule to handle the problem of large verdicts is
problematic because the rule is an "all-or-nothing" rule that "precludes weighing of probabilities or awarding partial
recoveries.").
102. See Note, supra note 33, at 433-39.
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benefits and fairness of allowing an injured party to attempt to prove the extent of his
damages. Courts faced with this choice are increasingly deciding in favor of allowing
the additional measure of damages if the plaintiff can prove such damages. 0 3
Although courts have "traditionally treated claims for lost profits erratically,"''1 4
they now are relaxing the requirement of certainty in order to ensure that the plaintiff
gets his full expectation interest, i.e., out-of-pocket losses plus gains prevented by the
breach. Thus, courts are abandoning the new business rule as a rule of admissibil-
ity 05 just as they abandoned the rule of absolute certainty in favor of the reasonable
certainty doctrine. ' 0 6
B. The New Business Rule as a Rule of Evidence
1. The Transition to a Rule of Evidence
The requirement of reasonable certainty in contract damages need not mandate
per se exclusion of all evidence of lost profits by a new business. Instead, the new
business rule can operate as a rule of evidence ensuring that reasonable proof of lost
profits is brought before the trier of fact, rather than as an absolute bar to recovery
of lost profits:
Courts are now taking the position that the distinction between established businesses
and new ones is a distinction that goes to the weight of the evidence and not a rule that
automatically precludes recovery of profits by a new business. What is required is
reasonable evidence, and that may at times be found in some fact other than the fact of past
profits.10 7
A growing number of jurisdictions are adopting this evidentiary approach to the
rule.10 8 In fact, since January 1985, when Ohio last confirmed adherence to the new
103. See, e.g., Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 680 P.2d 1235 (1984);
International Technical Instruments, Inc. v. Engineering Measurements Co., 678 P.2d 558 (Colo. App. 1983); Harsha v.
State Say. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1984); Pauline's Chicken Villa, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 701
S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987).
104. Note, supra note 10, at 993 (courts often allowed less than full recovery or denied recovery altogether under
the aegis of uncertainty).
105. See infra note 108.
106. Note, supra note 10, at 1020; R. DoNN, supra note 35, § 4.2, at 188. See also supra notes 18-22 and
accompanying text.
107. Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1,344 S.E.2d 82 (1986) (quoting D. Dosas, supra
note 7, § 3.3, at 155), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987). See also R.
DuNN, supra note 35, § 4.2, at 188.
108. Guard v. P & R Enters., Inc., 631 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1981); Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 680 P.2d 1235 (1984); S. Jon Kreedman & Co., v. Meyers Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58
Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); International Technical Instruments, Inc. v. Engineering Measurements Co.,
678 P.2d 558 (Colo. App. 1983); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980); Harsha v. State Say.
Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1984); Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 518 P.2d 512 (1974); Pauline's
Chicken Villa, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985); John D. Copanos & Sons, Inc. v.
McDade Rigging and Steel Erection Co., 43 Md. App. 204, 403 A.2d 402 (1979); Fern v. Villa Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich.
639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976); Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Cireo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1980); Alliance
Tractor & Implement Co. v. Lukens Tool & Die Co., 204 Neb. 248, 281 N.W.2d 778 (1979); General Elee. Supply Co.
v. Mt. Wheeler Power, Inc., 94 Nev. 766, 587 P.2d 1312 (1978); Price v. Von Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 120 P.2d 611 (1942);
Kenford Co. v. Erie County, 108 A.D.2d 132, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1985) aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 493 N.E.2d 234, 502
N.Y.S.2d 131 (1986); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987); Ferrell Constr.
Co. v. Russell Creek Coal Co., 645 P.2d 1005 (Okla. 1982); Welch v. U.S. Bancorp Realty & Mortgage Trust, 286 Or.
1987] NEW BUSINESS RULE AND DENIAL OF LOST PROFITS 869
business rule, 0 9 four new states have rejected the rule as an absolute rule of law and
have recognized the rule, instead, as a rule regulating the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff trying to establish lost profits. "10 In these and other states,"'
an injured party may recover anticipated future profits if he can show lost profits with
reasonable certainty, by evidence other than a prior track record of success.
In Pauline's Chicken Villa v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 112 for example, the
plaintiff had contracted with Kentucky Fried Chicken to operate a franchise in
Clarksville, Kentucky. 113 When Kentucky Fried Chicken later rescinded the contract,
the plaintiff sued seeking damages consisting solely of lost anticipated profits. 1'4 The
trial court ordered a directed verdict for defendant," 5 but the appellate court reversed
and remanded with the proviso that, as a matter of law, damages could not be
awarded for lost profits of a new business."t 6 The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed
the decision and abolished the new business rule, stating that "the test should not be
whether the business is a new or unestablished business without a history of past
profits but whether damages in the nature of lost profits may be established with
reasonable certainty." 117
Likewise, in Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co.,118 the Supreme Court of Hawaii
allowed prospective lessees of a fast food Chinese restaurant to prove lost profits even
though the defendant's breach of contract had prevented the plaintiffs from opening
the restaurant."19 In Chung, the court noted that only uncertainty as to the fact of
damage and not the amount of damage' 20 would prevent recovery under the rubric of
673, 596 P.2d 947 (1979); Delahanty v. First Pa. Bank, 318 Pa. Super. 90, 464 A.2d 1243 (1983); Smith Dev. Corp.
v. Bilow Enters., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973); Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66
Wash. 2d 469,403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1966); Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d
1382, reh'g denied, 566 P.2d 219 (\Vyo. 1977).
109. Schechter v. Flavor Kitchens, Inc., No. 48552, slip op. (8th Ohio Dist. Ct. App., Jan. 31, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file).
110. Pauline's Chicken Villa, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985), aff'd, 67
N.Y.2d 257, 493 N.E.2d 234, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1986); Kenford Co. v. Erie County, 108 A.D.2d 132, 489 N.Y.S.2d
939 (1985); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987) (abrogated the new
business rule in the context of a tort action); Petty v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 288 S.C. 349, 342 S.E.2d 611 (1986) (tort
action).
111. See supra note 108.
112. 701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985).
113. Id. at 400.
114. Id. at 401.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also § 352, illustration 6 of the Restatement (Second). Illustration 6 of § 352 provides a good example
of the new business rule as a rule requiring only reasonable certainty:
6. A contracts with B to construct a new outdoor drive-in theatre, to be completed on June I. A does not
complete the theatre until September 1. Even though the business is a new rather than an established one, B may
be able to prove his lost profits with reasonable certainty. B can use records of the theatre's subsequent operation
and of the operation of similar theatres in the same locality, along with other evidence including market surveys
and expert testimony, in attempting to do this.
RFsrATeAe (Seco.m), supra note 7, § 352 comment b, illustration 6.
118. 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980).
119. Id. at 606, 618 P.2d at 291. See also Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 369 Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976)
(lessee may recover lost profits for breach of lease preventing lessee from going into possession of the leasehold where
lessee proves lost profits to a reasonable certainty).
120. Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 605, 618 P.2d 283, 290-91 (1980) (quoting Ferreira v. Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 44 Haw. 567, 575-76, 356 P.2d 651, 656 (1960)).
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uncertainty. 121 Courts have long used this distinction between fact of loss and amount
of loss to soften the unqualified requirement that damages be proved with reasonable
certainty. 22 Under this principle, as long as the fact of damages is certain, the exact
amount need not be shown with certainty. 123 "If the fact of damages is proved with
certainty the extent or amount may be left to reasonable inference.' '1 24 Relying on
this logic, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that if, under the circumstances, the
new business proved future profits with reasonable certainty, it could recover
although it had no history of past profits. 2 5 During the past ten years, this sufficiency
of the evidence approach has become the prevailing view in the majority of American
jurisdictions. 126
2. Rationale for Adoption of an Evidentiary Use of the New Business Rule
The evidentiary use of the new business rule should be adopted by Ohio and
other states currently using a per se application because the evidentiary approach
stands on firm doctrinal foundations. Among those factors arguing persuasively for
adoption of a rule that requires only sufficient evidence of lost profits are the
following: the expectancy interest is designed to fully compensate the injured party
by returning both the loss in value of the breaching party's performance and the loss
of expected gains prevented by the breach; 127 the accuracy of methods of proving lost
future profits has increased significantly; 128 and the new business rule is unfair
because it encourages breach against a new business by allowing the breaching party
to escape damages in the form of lost profits that might be proved to a reasonable
certainty. 129
The fundamental premise of contract damages is that damages should compen-
sate the injured promisee. 130 Courts generally do not apply legal sanctions to prevent
a promisor from breaching his contract but seek, instead, to ensure that the injured
121. Id. See also Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1214.
122. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parachment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); Cope v. Vermeer Sales
& Serv. of Colo., 650 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. App. 1982); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697,
705-06, 261 N.W.2d 358, 363-64 (1978); Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enters., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 214, 308 A.2d 477,
483 (1973). See also C. McConuicK, supra note 11, § 27 at 101-02 (if the fact of damage is proved with certainty, the
extent or amount of damage may be left to reasonable inference); Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1214; Note, supra note
10, at 1027 (if fact of loss is proved, most courts will give damages to prevent wrongdoer from profiting from the
uncertainty he created by breaching).
123. See S. WiULsroN, supra note 8, § 1345, at 232.
124. C. McCoMUlCK, supra note 11, § 27, at 101. Professor McCormick lists this fact of loss-extent of loss
dichotomy among the "modifying doctrines" which allow courts to require a high standard of certainty and yet avoid
harsh applications of the rule. For a complete list of McCormick's "modifying doctrines," see supra note 21.
125. Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 606, 618 P.2d 283, 291 (1980) (the plaintiff's proof of lost
profits included a reproduction cost analysis, a comparative market analysis, and an income stream analysis. These were
found to be satisfactory substitutes for a past profit history).
126. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 130-45 and accompanying text. See also supra note 7 containing the Restatement (Second)
definition of expectation interest which encompasses "other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by
the breach:" as well as the loss in value of the other party's performance.
128. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
130. A. CoRBIN, supra note 8, § 1002, at 31; D. DoBBs, supra note 7, § 12.1, at 786-87; REsrA-r.ENr (Srco.ND), supra
note 7, § 347 comment a.
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promisee is compensated for his loss. t31 Full compensation for breaches involving an
on-going business or a new business includes not only out-of-pocket costs but also
collateral profits or prevented gains that may be expected to flow from the
transaction.132 To use the new business rule as a rule specifying only that lost profits
be proved with reasonable certainty will put damages for lost profits of a new
business in line with other damage awards which purport to fully compensate the
plaintiff. 133
Moreover, adoption of a test of reasonable certainty will not automatically make
the contracting promisor a guarantor of lost profits. 134 The plaintiff still must
establish lost profits with the traditionally required "reasonable certainty." 1 35 In
Kenford Co. v. Erie County,136 for example, plaintiff Kenford Company contracted
to donate 178 acres of land to Erie County in exchange for the County's promise to
build a domed stadium on the premises and to allow the shareholder of Kenford
Company and his advisor to lease or manage the domed facility for a period of time
not to exceed forty years. 13 7 When Erie County did not receive bids on the stadium
that were within their budget, they voted not to proceed. ' 38 A jury eventually awarded
Kenford Company $25.6 million in profits lost because of breach of the management
contract. 139 The Fourth Department of the New York Appellate Division held that
131. See E.A. FARvs%.orm, supra note 9, § 12.1, at 812-13 (the injured promisee receives the "benefit of his
bargain," i.e., his expectation interest; generally there is no attempt to compel the promisor to perform); RxsrATBENr
(SEco.ow) Chap. 16, Introductory Note ("The traditional goal of contract damages has not been compulsion of the promisor
to perform his promise, but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach."); Farnsworth, supra note
1I, at 1145 (The American "system . . . is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach; rather it is aimed
at relief to promisees to redress breach." (emphasis in original). If courts do not require the promisor to perform,
however, they do require him to compensate the promisee for resulting losses.); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
132. See generally A. CoRSa, supra note 8, §§ 1022-23, at 139, 147-57 (Lost profits are, in essence, the prevention
of a plaintiff's "hoped-for gains." Full compensation of an established or a new business includes lost profits. The
limitation of certainty should not preclude lost profits for a new business if such profits are proved with reasonable
accuracy.). See also RE5rAamiENT (SEco.D), supra note 7, § 347 (the definition of expectation interest includes
consequential losses).
133. See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1147; Note, The Requirement of Certainty in the Proof of Lost Profits, 64
HARv. L. REv. 317, 319-321 (1950); See generally A. CoPsm, supra note 8, §§ 1022-23, at 135-57.
134. See, e.g., Guard v. P & R Enters., Inc., 631 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1981) (in remanding for reconsideration of
plaintiff's claim for lost profits, the Alaska Supreme Court said that although plaintiffs had the opportunity to prove lost
profits, the profits must meet the "reasonable certainty" threshold); Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 680 P.2d 1235 (1984) (inadequate basis for expert projections combined with fact that plaintiff had
no assured market and that there is a ninety-five percent failure rate for new catfish enterprises made proof insufficient);
Kenford Co. v. Erie County, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 493 N.E.2d 234, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1986) ("the multitude of assumptions
required to establish projections of profitability over the life of . . . [the] contract require speculation and conjecture,
making it beyond the capability of even the most sophisticated procedures to satisfy the legal requirements of proof with
reasonable certainty.").
135. See, e.g., Cope v. Vermeer Sales & Serv. of Colo., Inc., 650 P.2d 1307 (Colo. App. 1982); Chung v. Kaonohi
Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980); Harsha v. State Say. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1984); John D.
Companos & Sons, Inc. v. MeDade Rigging and Steel Erection Co., 43 Md. App. 204, 403 A.2d 402 (1979); Butcher
v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978). See ajso RrsTATLiENr (SEco.n), supra note 7, §
352, at 144 ("Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with
reasonable certainty.").
136. 108 A.D.2d 132, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 493 N.E.2d 234, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131
(1986).
137. Id. at 134, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42.
138. Id. at 134, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
139. Id. at 135, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
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although there is no rule in New York which automatically precludes a new business
from recovering lost profits, plaintiff's evidence contained too many variables and
was too uncertain to support an award of lost profits. 40 The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed, but substituted a slightly different rationale. The court held that
liability for extensive lost profits was not within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the contract's execution or breach.141 It further held that the numerous
assumptions relied upon to establish profitability projections precluded calculation of
lost profits within a reasonable degree of certainty. 42
Thus, a new enterprise's success in proving prospective profits will necessarily
depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. 143 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts embraces the idea that a new business may recover lost profits
that it proves with reasonable certainty' 44 but also recognizes the natural limitations
of that standard on new businesses. Comment b of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts succinctly states the rule as follows:
[I]f the business is a new one ... proof will be more difficult. Nevertheless, damages may
be established with reasonable certainty with the aid of expert testimony, economic and
financial data, market surveys and analyses, business records of similar enterprises, and the
like. 145
The promisor, then, is not automatically an insurer of the promisee's losses.
Weaknesses in the promisee's proffered evidence, however, should affect only the
weight and credibility of the testimony, not its admissibility.
A further reason for accepting a sufficiency of the evidence approach is that the
alternative means of proving prospective profits have increased greatly in accu-
racy. 146 These alternative methods include: (1) the yardstick method under which a
comparison is made with the profit performance of a business similar in size, nature,
140. Id. at 141-44, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49. The expert had projected that plaintiffs would be able to negotiate
contracts securing ten professional football games, and forty-two "open time events" including "three consumer shows,
six high school football games, five circuses and seven musical or entertainment events." He then estimated ticket prices
and parking and concession revenues as well as all salaries, advertising fees, legal fees, and miscellaneous expenses over
a twenty year period. The court concluded that although the breaching party bears the risk of uncertainty, plaintiff had
established neither the fact of loss nor the amount of loss. Id. at 144, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 947-49. On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed on slightly different grounds as noted in the text.
141. Kenford Co. v. Erie County, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 262, 493 N.E.2d 234, 236, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (1986).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Guard v. P & R Enters., Inc., 631 P.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Alaska 1981) (intimating that, on these
facts, the lower court might find no loss profits on remand); Rancho Peseado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
140 Ariz. 174, 184, 680 P.2d 1235, 1245 (1984) (new business could not prove lost profits given particular facts of the
case); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 606, 618 P.2d 283, 291 (1980) (evidence needed to prove future
profits with the requisite legal certainty depends on the individual facts of each case); Pauline's Chicken Villa v. Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp., 701 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985) (there is no "single definition of 'reasonable certainty."' The
court must look to the "factors and elements" of the case.); Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enters. Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 212,
308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973) (reasonable certainty will "depend in large measure upon the circumstances of the particular
case and thus will escape the hard and fast rules of general applicability.") (quoting Note, The Requirement of Certainty
in Lost Profits, 64 HARV. L. REv. 317, 319 (1950)).
144. RF5TAT Er (SEcors), supra note 7, § 352 comment b.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. See generally Comment, supra note 34, at 713-21 (analyzing various methods of proving lost profits with
reasonable certainty, absent a past profit history). See also A. CosaBI, supra note 8, § 1023, at 150-57; E.A. Fsasswosm,
supra note 9, § 12.15, at 841-42; S. WIturroN, supra note 8, § 1346A, at 245-51 (methods of proving lost profits); Note,
supra note 133, at 319; Note, supra note 10, at 1018-20.
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and location;1 47 (2) comparison with the profit history of plaintiff's successor, as in
a case in which a lessor breaches his promise to lease land to the plaintiff and
subsequently leases to another person who establishes a successful business;1 48 (3)
comparison of profits made by the plaintiff himself in a previously or subsequently
owned business which is similar in nature and location; 49 and (4) use of economic
and financial data and expert testimony. 150 In addition to these more accurate
measures of proving lost profits, the rules of evidence have been relaxed to permit
business reports, records, and other documents as admissible evidence and to ensure
that the complex statistics needed to prove profits is presented in a way comprehen-
sible to the jury or court.' 51
Finally, fairness also weighs in favor of adoption of the sufficiency of the
evidence approach. The new business rule is an all-or-nothing rule which gives
nothing to a new business seeking lost profits. When two parties freely enter a
contractual relationship and the promisor later breaches the contract and, thus,
precludes ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it is patently unfair
to reward the promisor by automatically denying lost profits which is often the
principal element of the damage award. Such a denial has been characterized as
follows:
[I]t would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the
injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amends for his
acts.... The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they [profits] cannot be measured
with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is
responsible for making, were otherwise.152
Indeed, fairness requires that the strict application of the new business rule be
rejected because American rules of contract damages, which purport to put the
plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the other party performed,
encourage all parties, including new businesses to rely on the contracts they make.
147. See, e.g., G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526 (1 th Cir. 1985); Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 822 (1 th Cir. 1984); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 677 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Pauline's Chicken Villa, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 701 S.W.2d 399 (Ky.
1985); Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1980); Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow
Enters., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973).
148. See, e.g., Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980); see also S. WJroN, supra note
8, § 1346A, at 249 and cases cited therein (profits made by others, including those of plaintiff's successor may be a
sufficient substitute for a past profit history); Comment, supra note 34, at 715-16 (same).
149. See, e.g., Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980); Fer v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396
Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976); S. Wnnsro.N, supra note 8, § 1346A, at 249; Comment, supra note 34, at 716.
150. See, e.g., G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
500 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); S. Jon Kreedman & Sons v. Meyers Bros.
Parking-Western Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594,
618 P.2d 283 (1980); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976); Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow
Enters., Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973); Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 390 P.2d 677 (1964);
Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978); see also S. WLirrON, supra note 8, §
1346A, at 250 (evidence of experts may be sufficient); Comment, supra note 34 at 719-21.
151. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
152. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931); see also Lee v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980)
(new business rule is "grossly unfair.").
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Both new and established businesses incur preparatory costs and forego other
business opportunities in part in reliance on the belief that if the contract is breached,
the promisee will be put in the same position he would have occupied had the contract
been performed. 53 This reliance on promised performance allows for efficient
production and lower operating costs. 154 Failure to reimburse a new business for its
lost profits, therefore, is unfair because it fails to return to the disappointed promisee
his full expectation after encouraging the promisee to rely on the promise.
Furthermore, the new business rule can lead to inefficiency because, as will be
discussed more fully in the next section, 155 it actually encourages breaches 56 against
a new business by making the lost profits element of traditional damage awards
irrelevant to a promisor's decision of whether or not to breach his contract.
IV. ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE NEW BUSINESS RULE
Economic analysis of contract damages 57 provides an important analogue to the
traditional view of contract damages examined above. An economic analysis supports
the conclusion that courts should award damages for future profits to a new business
when profits are provable with reasonable certainty. Traditional economic theory
posits that the goal of the economy is efficiency, i.e., that goods and resources be
used in their most productive manner. Under this analysis, a promise of future
dealings with a new business allows both parties to plan their behavior, such as
entering into collateral contracts to equip a plant, sell merchandise, or increase
output.' 5 8 Assuming that individuals act rationally to maximize their own welfare,
contracts can be accurately defined as voluntary exchanges of assets by individuals
seeking to obtain goods or services they value more highly in exchange for goods they
own.' 5 9 If the contract results in a benefit or gain to both parties, society moves closer
to the goal of economic efficiency. Within the economic framework, then, the
purpose of contract damages is to facilitate maximum societal benefit or efficiency
from these voluntary exchanges.
According to Judge Posner, the objective of maximum societal efficiency can be
achieved by encouraging, through appropriate damage awards, the fulfillment of
promises unless the result would be an inefficient reallocation of resources.t6 In
153. Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YAE L.J. 52, 62-63 (1936); Note, supra note
10, at 995.
154. Fuller & Purdue, supra note 153, at 61-65; Note, supra note 10, at 995.
155. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Guard v. P & R Enters., Inc., 631 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Alaska 1981) (to deny lost profits as a matter
of law would be to encourage promisor's contracting with a new business to breach their contracts); Vickers v. Wichita
State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 620, 518 P.2d 512, 517 (1974) (same).
157. See generally THE ECONO IcS OF Come.rrcr LAw (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979); E.A. FsAesuorm, supra
note 9, § 12.3, at 816-18; R. POSNER, EcoNo.uc ANALYSIS OF LAW Chap. 4 (3d ed. 1986); RmsrAmserEr (SEco.o), supra note
'7, Chap. 16 Introductory Note, at 101-02; Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RurGRs L. Rev. 273 (1970).
158. R. POSsER, supra note 157, § 4.8, at 109-10 (reliance costs during the executory period include planning and
adjustments in the business necessary to perform the contract); Fuller & Purdue, supra note 153, at 62-63.
159. E.A. FARsswoaRT, supra note 9, § 12.3, at 816; REsrATmEurr (SEcoND), supra note 7, Chap. 16 Introductory
Note, at 101.
160. R. POSNER, supra note 157, § 4.8, at 107.
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other words, given a promise which society wants to encourage, such as a promise
to a new business, contract damages must exact from the party in breach an amount
sufficient to cover the other party's entire loss because only then can we be assured
that the breaching party will use the goods in a more productive, more efficient
manner than under the original voluntary agreement. Assuming that the breaching
party acts rationally to maximize his own welfare, he will breach the contract only if
his gain from the breach is greater than the amount necessary to fully compensate the
injured party for his loss from the breach. ' 6' Judge Posner illustrated the importance
of not awarding damages which are less than the injured party's expectation or
subjective measure of losses with the following example. 162
A contracts to sell B for $100,000 a machine that is worth $110,000 to B, i.e., that
would yield him a profit of $10,000. Before delivery C comes to A and offers him $109,000
for the machine promised B. A would be tempted to breach were he not liable to B for B's
loss of expected profit. Given that measure of damages, C will not be able to induce a breach
of A's contract with B unless he offers B more than $110,000, thereby indicating that the
machine really is worth more to him than to B.163
Posner concluded that a rule which returns the injured party's expectation interest,
including his expected gains or "lost profits," ensures that the goods or services are
used at their highest value. 164
Only if the gain to the breaching party is greater than the injured party's loss,
including lost profits, will the breaching party break his contract, compensate the
injured party, and use the resources in the more productive manner. This measure of
damages, derived from economic analysis, is remarkably parallel to the traditional
"expectation interest" which demands damages sufficient to put the injured party in
the position he would have been had the contract been performed. Economic analysis,
however, goes further than traditional contract analysis because it not only prescribes
the appropriate measure of damages upon breach, but also teaches that "efficient
breaches" are to be encouraged by society.' 65
The new business rule, however, artificially removes from the breaching party's
calculation of costs of the breach the element of lost profits, which is often the
greatest element of damages. Thus, in a jurisdiction adhering to the per se application
of the new business rule, it will not always be the case that what is beneficial for the
individual breaching party will be efficient for society as a whole. A promisor may
find it profitable to breach only if he need not pay lost profits. If this is the case and
161. Id.; see also E.A. FARNsAoRTH, supra note 9, § 12.3, at 817 (A principle called the Kaldor-Hicks principle is
often used to evaluate the breacher's gain and the injured party's loss. Under this principle, breach is to be encouraged
if the party who benefits from the breach calculates his gain as large enough to receive a net benefit after fully
compensating the injured party, according to the injured party's subjective measurement of his own loss. Tersely stated,
the breach is efficient if "the party who benefits [the breacher] values his gains more than the loser values his losses.").
Id.
162. R. PosNm, Eco.o.%uc ANAL'sts or Lw § 4.9 (2d ed. 1977) (this example did not appear in the third edition of
Judge Posner's book which is otherwise cited herein).
163. Id. at 90.
164. Id.
165. R. PosN ,, supra note 157, § 4.8, at 107 (efficient breaches are really "involuntary" because they are
committed "only to avert a larger loss").
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the promisor does breach, the result is that the promisor is transferring his resources
to a less efficient use, and society will be less well off. The per se application of the
new business rule, then, is skewed toward allowing inefficient breaches. To prevent
such inefficient breaches, and thus maximize societal productivity, the damage award
to a new business should include lost profits when proved with the requisite degree
of certainty.
V. CONCLUSION
The new business rule is a per se rule that automatically denies recovery of lost
profits by a new business or enterprise because the business has no history of past
profits. The rule is a manifestation of the requirement of certainty adopted by
common law courts to restrict the award of large damages by jurors. The majority of
American jurisdictions have abandoned this absolute denial of all lost profits in favor
of a rule of evidence which permits the owner of a failed new business to try to
establish lost profits with reasonable certainty through expert testimony, business
forecasting techniques, or other reliable data.
Under this evidentiary approach, the fact that there is no history of past profits
goes to the weight and sufficiency of plaintiff's proof but not to its admissibility. A
minority of states, including Ohio, however, still embrace the rigid application of the
new business rule and deny lost profits as a matter of law. Many of these states have
created and enlarged exceptions to the new business rule in order to award a fair
measure of contract damages.
The new business rule, however, no longer retains its original vitality. Policy
considerations in favor of an evidentiary use of the new business rule outweigh those
considerations originally advanced for the per se denial of lost profits to a new
business. First, the rule does not adequately address the problem of excessive
verdicts. Second, courts have almost unanimously recognized other methods of
accurately showing lost profits. Finally, the policies of efficiency and judicial
economy inherent in the new business rule are outweighed by the fairness to the
plaintiff of the evidentiary approach and by the procedural safeguards provided under
the rules of evidence.
Thus, Ohio and other courts still adhering to the strict new business rule should
welcome the opportunity to address the issue of lost profits by a new business. These
courts should reject the new business rule in favor of the majority approach requiring
only that the plaintiff prove his losses with reasonable certainty.
Bernadette J. Bollas
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